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ABSTRACT Substitution boxes (S-boxes) are critical nonlinear elements to achieve cryptanalytic resis-
tance of modern block and stream ciphers. Given their importance, a rich variety of S-box construction
strategies exists. In this paper, S-boxes generated by using chaotic functions (CF) are analyzed to measure
their actual resistance to linear cryptanalysis. The aforementioned papers emphasize on the average
nonlinearity of the S-box coordinates only, ignoring the rest of the S-box components in the process. Thus,
the majority of those studies should be re-evaluated. Integrating such S-boxes in a given cryptosystem should
be done with a considerable caution. Furthermore, we show that in the context of nonlinearity optimization
problem the profit of using chaos structures is negligible. By using two heuristic methods and starting from
pseudo-random S-boxes, we repeatedly reached S-boxes, which significantly outperform all previously
published CF-based S-boxes, in those cryptographic terms, which the aforementioned papers utilize for
comparison. Moreover, we have linked the multi-armed bandit problem to the problem of maximizing
an S-box average coordinate nonlinearity value, which further allowed us to reach near-optimal average
coordinate nonlinearity values significantly greater than those known in literature.
INDEX TERMS chaos, multi-armed bandit problem, nonlinearity, S-boxes
I. INTRODUCTION
The cryptographic properties of vector boolean functions, or
S-boxes, are thoroughly examined by introducing a rich list
of desirable parameters an S-box should have in order to
guarantee an acceptable resistance to sophisticated crypto-
graphic attacks such as, for example, linear cryptanalysis [1]
[2], differential cryptanalysis [3], boomerang attack [4] or in-
terpolation attack [5]. Furthermore, S-boxes are widely used
in modern cryptographic algorithms like AES [6], Whirlpool
[7], Camellia [8] and many others.
Despite the rich variety of proposed methods for S-boxes
generation, we mainly focus on S-box constructions benefit-
ing from the study of chaos, to further analyze their actual
resistance to linear cryptanalysis.
In Section II we introduce the definitions of some basic
cryptographic characteristics used to measure the crypto-
graphic strength of a given S-box.
In Section III we show that the actual nonlinearity value,
or NL, of the majority of chaotic functions-based (CF-based)
published S-boxes differs from the average nonlinearity value
originally announced. This discrepancy is based on the fact
that the aforementioned papers consider the average nonlin-
earity of the S-box coordinates only, or ACNV, ignoring the
rest of the S-box components in the process. In Section IV,
we propose an algorithm, which significantly outperforms all
previously published S-boxes in terms of ACNV. During our
experiments, we repeatedly reached S-boxes with ACNV of
114. We want to emphasize, that ACNV greater than 112.0,
to the best of our knowledge, was never achieved in the
literature.
In Section V, we demonstrate the efficiency of the pro-
posed algorithm by optimizing the ACNV of some popular
S-boxes. Thus, we show that the starting state of the op-
timization routines is negligible. Having this in mind, the
competitiveness of S-boxes generated by exploiting chaos
structures, at least in the context of S-box nonlinearity op-
timization problem, is arguable. The same observation was
made in [9].
Then, in Section VI, we translate the S-box ACNV opti-
mization problem to the multi-armed bandit problem, which
allow us to further improve our results by reaching an ACNV
of 114.5 - a value significantly larger than those known in
literature.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let B = {0, 1}. A Boolean function f(x) of n variables
x1, · · · , xn is a mapping f : Bn 7→ B from n binary
inputs x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ Bn to one binary output
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y = f(x) ∈ B.
Definition 1 (Algebraic Normal Form – ANF f ): The alge-
braic normal form of an n-variable Boolean function f(x) is
given by the following equation:
ANF f = a0 ⊕ a1x1 ⊕ a2x2 ⊕ a1,2,··· ,nx1x2 · · ·xn,
where the coefficients ai···j ∈ B = {0, 1}.
A linear Boolean function f is a function with specific
algebraic normal form ANFf , s.t. no term with algebraic de-
gree greater than 1 exists. A more formal definition follows:
Definition 2 (Linear Boolean Function): Any n-variable
Boolean function of the form:
lw(x) =< w, x >= w1x1 ⊕ w2x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ wnxn,
where w, x ∈ Bn, is called a linear Boolean function.
An n-binary input into m-binary output mapping S :
Bn ⇔ Bm, which assigns some y = (y1, y2, · · · , ym) ∈
Bm by S(x) = y to each x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) ∈ Bn, is
called an (n × m) substitution table (S-box) and is denoted
by S(n,m).
An S-box S(n,m) is said to be bijective, if it maps each
input x ∈ Bn to a distinct output y = S(x) ∈ Bm and
all possible 2m outputs are present. For example, the (n, n)
bijective S-boxes are Boolean permutations on Fn2 , where F2
is a finite field with two elements.
An S-box S(n,m) can be bijective only when n = m.
Clearly, a bijective S-box S(n, n) represents a permutation
of its 2n inputs, since each input is mapped to a distinct
output and all possible 2n outputs are present. In this way,
S(n, n) will be reversible, that is, there is a mapping from
each distinct output to its corresponding input.
Definition 3 (Look-up Table): The look-up table LUT of an
S-box S(n,m) is a (2n × m) binary matrix SLUT , which
rows consist of all outputs of S(n,m), corresponding to all
possible 2n inputs ordered lexicographically.
S =

f1(0, 0, ..., 0) f2(0, 0, ..., 0) ... fm(0, 0, ..., 0)
f1(0, 0, ..., 1) f2(0, 0, ..., 1) · · · fm(0, 0, ..., 1)
...
...
...
...
f1(1, 1, ..., 0) f2(1, 1, ..., 0) · · · fm(1, 1, ..., 0)
f1(1, 1, ..., 1) f2(1, 1, ..., 1) · · · fm(1, 1, ..., 1)

We define each column of SLUT as coordinate of S. All
linear combinations of coordinates of S are called compo-
nents of S.
Definition 4 (Linear Approximation Table): The linear ap-
proximation table of an S-box S(n,m), denoted by SLAT , is
a (2n×2m) table, which entries are given by: SLAT [X][Y ] =
2n−1 − dH(X,Y ), where Y is a linear combination of the
coordinates of the current S-box, X is the consequent linear
function with length n and dH(X,Y ) denotes the Hamming
distance between X and Y .
The linear approximation table of a given S-box S(n,n)
reveals the actual correlation between the components of S
and all linear Boolean functions sharing the same dimension
n.
Definition 5 (S-box Nonlinearity): The nonlinearity of an S-
box S(n,m) is defined as SNL = 2n−1−max ({abs(wi)}) ,
where {wi} is the set of all elements in the LAT, excluding
the first row and the first column.
Lower values of nonlinearity could be exploited by the
family of linear cryptanalysis attacks. Having this in mind,
higher nonlinearity value is a desirable S-box property.
Each S-box is uniquely defined by its LUT. Therefore, if
we translate each row of the LUT as decimal number, we can
obtain a unique decimal representation of the S-box denoted
by DLUT.
III. CHAOS-BASED S-BOX CONSTRUCTIONS
The methods involved in CF S-box constructions are mani-
fold. For example, chaos function combined with travelling
salesman problem [10], chaotic substitution box design [11],
1D chaotic map combined with β-Hill climbing [12], chaotic
map combined with sine-cosine optimization [13], chaotic
system with multiple attractors [14], chaotic map combined
with heuristics [15], one-dimensional discrete chaotic map
[16], hyperchaotic systems [17] [18], spatiotemporal chaotic
dynamics [19], chaotic map combined with genetic algo-
rithms [20], chaotic logistic maps combined with bacterial
foraging optimization [21] and many others (see Table 6).
Usually, the best candidate of each method is further com-
pared to others in terms of important cryptographic proper-
ties like nonlinearity, differential uniformity [22] and strict
avalanche criterion (SAC) [23]. The majority of authors
emphasize on the ACNV of their best candidate. In Table
1 the coordinate nonlinearities of several S-box candidates
achieved by some CF-based methods are presented. A more
detailed overview is given in Table 6.
The actual nonlinearity of an S-box is calculated by the
minimum nonlinearity of all the components of the S-box.
For example, let us take an arbitrary S-box F (5, 5) with
FLUT = [f0, f1, f2, f3, f4]. Each column of FLAT is
determined by some linear combination of coordinates of F ,
sorted lexicographically, from left to right, by the binary rep-
resentation of the column index, zero-filled to 5. Let FLAT [i]
denotes the i-th column of FLAT . Then, for example, the
FLAT [11] column holds the nonlinear characteristics of the
Boolean function f1⊕f3⊕f4, while FLAT [4] holds the non-
linear characteristics of the Boolean function f3. In Figure
1 the coordinate decomposition of FLAT is visualized. Each
coordinate is associated with distinct color. The number of
segments in each column corresponds to the number of terms
in the respective linear combination of coordinates. Since
FLAT [0] is the trivial linear combination (all coefficients are
equal to zero), we leave the first column of Figure 1 colorless.
For technical reasons and better illustration, the coordinate
decomposition example is based on a (5, 5) S-box. However,
it is applicable to S-boxes of any dimension.
As defined in Definition 5, we seek the maximum absolute
value v of all the elements in S-box S(n, n) LAT, to find the
nonlinearity of S, i.e. SNL = 2n−1 − v.
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FIGURE 1. Coordinate decomposition of a (5, 5) S-box LAT
In Table 2 the actual nonlinearity of each S-box from
Table 1 is calculated. The deviations observed are due to
the fact that the designers consider the nonlinearity values
of coordinates only (the non-segmented columns in the (8, 8)
coordinate decomposition).
In the context of block ciphers, a low nonlinearity S-
box value is associated with the cipher linear cryptanalysis
resistance [24] [2] [25].
IV. ALTERNATIVE CONSTRUCTION
As we have shown in the previous section, the average value
of the nonlinearities of the coordinates of a given S-box
S doesn’t correspond to the the actual nonlinearity of S.
However, from the designer perspective, if a higher value of
ACNV is desirable, a new heuristic construction is suggested.
In general, if we want to improve the nonlinearity of a
given bijective S-box S(n, n), a strategy of lowering the ab-
solute value of coefficients in SLAT makes sense. Moreover,
the elements of each column of SLAT are entangled by the
Parceval’s theorem [26]. Let’s denote as Ci the array com-
TABLE 1. Comparison of nonlinearity of some CF-based (8, 8) S-boxes
Method f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
Ahmad [10] 108 110 110 108 106 106 106 106
Ahmad [11] 104 106 106 104 102 108 106 106
Al Solami [18] 108 110 108 108 106 110 108 110
Alzaidi [12] 110 112 110 110 110 110 110 110
Alzaidi [13] 110 110 110 110 110 108 110 108
Belazi [15] 106 106 106 104 108 102 106 104
Lai [14] 104 110 104 108 104 104 106 104
Liu [19] 108 102 104 104 102 104 106 106
Lambic [16] 106 106 106 106 106 108 108 106
Peng [17] 102 102 104 104 102 100 106 102
Tian [21] 106 106 110 108 106 108 108 108
posed of the elements of SLAT [i]. Since we want to lower the
nonlinearities of coordinates of S only, an evaluating function
E(S) is created, s.t.E(S) =
∑n−1
p=0
∑
x∈C2p |x|M ,whereM
denotes a magnitude of our choice. The restriction x ∈ C2p
narrows down the set of possible columns of SLAT to be
optimized, in terms of nonlinearity, to the set of coordinates
of S. As example, in case of a S(5, 5) S-box, the evaluation
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TABLE 2. Real nonlinearity values (NL) of the S-boxes given in Table 1
Method min max ACNV NL
Ahmad [10] 106 110 107.5 90
Ahmad [11] 102 108 105.25 94
Al Solami [18] 106 110 108.5 94
Alzaidi [12] 110 112 110.25 96
Alzaidi [13] 108 110 109.5 94
Belazi [15] 102 108 105.25 88
Lai [14] 104 110 105.5 92
Liu [19] 102 108 104.5 96
Lambic [16] 106 108 106.5 94
Peng [17] 100 102 102.75 88
Tian [21] 106 110 107.5 92
function threats as significant the elements inside the colored
columns of SLAT illustrated in Figure 2.
By using stochastic1 hill climbing as heuristic function,
starting from arbitrary pseudo-random S-box construction
and by using E(S), algorithm 1 is proposed.
Algorithm 1
1: s← R(n) . the function R(n) generates pseudo-random
bijective S-box S(n, n)
2: repeat
3: sdupl← s
4: RT(sdupl) . the function RT(S) make a random
transposition in S
5: if E(sdupl) < E(s) then
6: s← sdupl
7: end if
8: until STOP condition is reached . reaching n(n−1)4
cycles
Given an S-box S(n, n), and by using just one transposi-
tion, we can reach a total of
(
n
2
)
S-boxes. Let denote this set
as ST . We further define a set SI , s.t. W ∈ SI ⇐⇒ W ∈
ST ∧E(W ) < E(S). In case |SI | = 1, and we are allowed to
randomly pick |S
T |
2 elements from S
T , the probability some
of the picked elements to belong to SI is 12 . The threshold
value of the stop condition in Algorithm 1 is constructed on
this observation.
V. RESULTS PART I
By using a magnitude of 10, we repeatedly generated S-boxes
with high coordinate nonlinearities. During our experiments,
we have tried various magnitude values. However, larger or
smaller values of the magnitude are respectively too aggres-
sive or too tolerant to the largest elements of the S-box LAT.
In Figure 7 the DLUT, in a hexadecimal format, of an
optimized S-box Sc(8, 8) is presented. The first row and
column of the table correspond respectively to the first and
second half of the input in hexadecimal format. For example,
the input 11110101, equal to f5, is transformed by Sc to 5d.
The characteristics of Sc are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
1hill climbing without neighborhood search
FIGURE 2. Columns of interest of a (5, 5) S-box LAT
TABLE 3. Nonlinearities of Sc by coordinates
Method f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
this work 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114
In [27], Table 5, a summary on the CF-based S-box con-
structions found in the literature is presented (an updated
version of it is to be found in Table 6). We significantly
outperform all of them in terms of ACNV and SAC, reaching
the optimal SAC value of 0.5.
We further launched the algorithm on some popular (8,8)
S-box constructions. However, because of the non determin-
istic nature of the optimization process, it is difficult to match
a given S-box input Sstart, which is to be optimized, with the
final optimized S-box Send. To achieve such matching, we
have restricted the algorithm of changing the first 16 elements
of Sstart. This allows us to further demonstrate the flexibility
of the optimization process. Furthermore, since the first 16
elements of Sstart and Send are always shared, Send can be
successfully matched to Sstart.
In Figures 3 and 4, an optimized by algorithm 1 versions
of Rijndael [6] and Whirlpool [7] S-boxes are presented. The
colored cells represent those elements of the corresponding
S-box, which were not modified during the optimization pro-
cess. Furthermore, in Figures 5 and 6, the optimized versions
of Fantomas [28] and Skipjack [29] S-boxes are given.
All of the aforementioned S-boxes are optimized to the
ACNV of 114.0. Algorithm 1 was implemented with the
built-in tools provided by the open-source mathematical soft-
ware system SageMath [30].
VI. S-BOX AS MULTI-ARMED BANDITS
The space of bijective S-boxes is vast. For example, in the
case of (8,8) S-boxes, we have a total of 256! ≈ 21684
different bijective S-boxes. Despite algorithm 1 efficiency in
finding S-boxes with better ACNV, we had never reached an
4 VOLUME 4, 2016
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00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
00 63 7c 77 7b f2 6b 6f c5 30 01 67 2b fe d7 ab 76
10 c2 92 c9 7d fb 59 47 f0 ad c4 c0 ae c8 a4 3a a8
20 b7 fd 93 26 36 3f fa cc 34 a5 e5 f1 71 d8 b5 11
30 04 c7 33 c3 18 96 05 9c 07 12 88 e1 eb 2f b2 35
40 09 82 2c 1b 19 6e 1a a0 42 3b d6 bb 29 e2 27 85
50 53 d1 20 ed 10 fc 31 4b 6a cb be 39 8e 4c 58 ef
60 d0 8f a2 f7 43 0d 23 84 46 e9 03 7e 50 38 9f 2a
70 51 a3 40 cf 83 9d 28 f3 bd b6 de 21 00 ff f5 d2
80 cd d4 13 ee 5d 97 44 17 0c a7 7f 3d 64 5f 5b 73
90 41 a1 4f dd 22 aa 90 80 45 ec f8 14 db 5e 0b 9b
a0 e0 7a 6d 0a 49 06 24 5c ca d3 ac 66 91 95 e4 32
b0 e7 9a 37 79 8d d5 4e a9 6c 56 f4 ea 65 72 af 08
c0 ba 78 25 2e 1c a6 b4 c6 e8 dc 74 1f 5a bc 8b 8a
d0 70 3e b1 e6 48 02 f6 0e 61 75 57 b9 86 c1 1d 9e
e0 e3 b8 98 15 69 d9 4a 94 da 1e 87 f9 ce 55 3c df
f0 8c 81 89 4d bf 62 52 68 60 99 2d 0f b0 54 b3 16
FIGURE 3. An optimized AES S-box using Algorithm 1
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
00 18 23 c6 e8 87 b8 01 4f 36 a6 d2 f5 79 6f 91 52
10 f8 46 ae 1f df 5d 0d 83 ca 28 e0 ec 22 6d fe 2a
20 53 67 37 f4 3f d0 2d ce 38 59 2b 0c c9 e3 6b b1
30 9d 5b 10 26 cb bc da 73 e6 33 41 09 34 7d fc 98
40 92 dd 74 35 bb ab 5f 9e c8 5c a7 8d af 4c 81 3b
50 19 32 0b 71 8f 89 13 63 c2 51 4a 21 9a 0a 06 04
60 93 0f d5 82 ba cd 1e 84 ff 7a 85 47 e1 c1 1a e4
70 6c 54 c3 f3 60 ad 8c 5e 1c 44 02 dc 1b a1 a3 3d
80 b5 00 ed 2f 78 d9 9f 49 17 69 6a f7 31 77 30 ef
90 2e d1 a2 ea fb 9b 97 40 d8 9c 55 4d f2 75 27 8a
a0 eb 86 5a fa 42 ee a8 b7 f1 57 29 80 90 12 39 65
b0 cf 3c 76 f0 7b 61 62 03 11 45 20 16 43 c7 bf d6
c0 05 4e 4b 1d db b3 7e f6 72 66 de a5 e7 f9 7f b2
d0 25 b0 be 50 68 70 bd 07 d3 6e c4 e5 3e b9 8e a9
e0 8b 94 08 15 cc aa fd b4 c5 58 a0 56 2c 0e 14 c0
f0 24 3a ac 99 e9 b6 d4 95 48 a4 88 e2 d7 7c 64 96
FIGURE 4. An optimized Whirlpool S-box using Algorithm 1
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
00 1e 75 5f e1 99 fc 89 2f 86 ee f1 7b 23 52 10 94
10 4f 59 2c 8b f8 42 30 00 6e 84 35 70 a0 c3 34 6f
20 4e 41 01 78 8f a8 07 6c 62 af 7f 22 60 79 90 ec
30 68 f4 c4 32 1d 8c 0e ce de 3f 44 1f 40 98 43 d6
40 e7 cc e0 e6 d1 9a 1a b3 28 1c 7c 0c b9 c0 71 21
50 cb 11 9e e3 48 cd e9 57 f5 63 36 1b b8 bf 9d a7
60 61 d7 f3 a9 12 fd c1 b7 8e a6 6b 66 72 64 85 d5
70 4b 7e 67 3c 65 17 ba 4a 97 29 83 6a ae f0 e4 2e
80 77 74 e8 2a ac 95 3a a2 3d fa 50 58 ea 9f 93 33
90 b5 5c 06 51 a3 76 7a 80 bd 16 39 0a 03 73 d0 05
a0 f9 b0 55 2d b2 49 f7 19 c6 45 d2 d8 5d f2 87 ed
b0 da eb 91 ca 3b 47 cf fb c7 dc f6 a4 df fe b1 09
c0 0f 0d 2b 26 14 ff 4d bc 02 81 b4 be 15 c5 d4 27
d0 88 04 82 c8 46 e5 24 c2 9b 7d 8d d9 38 6d ef a1
e0 dd 69 5a 54 9c 53 25 20 5b db 37 5e ab 56 0b 4c
f0 13 3e 8a d3 ad 31 08 96 a5 18 b6 e2 aa 92 c9 bb
FIGURE 5. An optimized Fantomas S-box using Algorithm 1
TABLE 4. SAC, Coordinate-average and final nonlinearity of Sc
Method min max ACNV SAC NL
this work 114 114 114 0.5000000 96
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
00 a3 d7 09 83 f8 48 f6 f4 b3 21 15 78 99 b1 af f9
10 5a 6b 69 0a 0f 27 ca 2f 52 95 c3 0d 4e a0 c5 2c
20 8a 12 38 6e bb d9 c8 e2 cd 02 7e 5f f1 87 19 8f
30 96 fe 2d de b2 6f b6 ac 0c ae e5 7c f7 43 aa 2a
40 b9 f3 7b 1e eb 9a cf 73 ee 61 1a a9 50 9b ff b8
50 76 39 92 7f 3a 8c bf 14 60 58 80 e1 66 0b 86 90
60 1f 91 62 ed 33 a6 65 e0 67 d4 82 d6 6d 98 e6 74
70 e8 44 93 c2 b0 fc 9d 6a 81 fa 56 42 4d 05 4a 5c
80 d8 5d df a4 49 1d 9e 16 4c d2 be 00 ba c6 47 53
90 84 c0 55 3f 1c c7 d5 a2 88 34 dc c9 7d 3c 31 20
a0 d3 2e e9 28 9c 8e 23 ce dd 94 85 a5 22 79 a8 40
b0 30 4b e4 1b d1 89 a7 3b 11 c1 fd 36 e7 cc 5b 64
c0 9f 04 a1 51 97 13 26 f0 29 db cb 7a 75 8b 77 d0
d0 3d ef bc 70 71 63 37 2b ec 41 da 24 ad 8d 10 18
e0 01 b5 54 07 35 4f b7 c4 32 17 b4 fb 72 06 ab 0e
f0 5e 6c 68 f2 57 25 f5 e3 bd 08 3e 03 45 59 ea 46
FIGURE 6. An optimized Skipjack S-box using Algorithm 1
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
00 ab f0 5e 3f fa e2 6f 8e 3c 36 30 db 29 73 da 45
10 87 f9 60 3b bf a4 c7 0c a9 c0 f3 cb 68 ff ee a6
20 90 57 f2 77 ef c2 78 b7 94 32 e6 4d 53 6d 26 98
30 c1 2c 2a 9a 12 2b ea e8 17 7c 5c 6e 50 d9 f6 88
40 83 69 5a 67 af b9 1a b8 8a d4 b4 a0 cc e1 24 c6
50 be 1f a1 51 9f 64 4e 4f 2f 85 6b 76 86 35 4b ed
60 81 84 39 13 62 c3 9e dc d0 66 5f 44 de 1c bd 34
70 1d 1e 2d 6c a2 46 97 c5 37 61 a3 56 fe f7 d5 38
80 ce 05 09 18 aa fc 91 28 9b 10 e9 0b 71 dd e7 23
90 7f 72 59 6a 43 fd d1 e4 f8 0d 55 74 c8 f5 27 65
a0 93 c4 19 49 00 20 3d 2e a8 d3 01 7d 25 0e f4 33
b0 02 04 0a 14 16 ae 31 11 cf 79 8f d8 8b d7 ca b3
c0 bb 3e 0f 92 df 40 4c cd ac 22 5b a5 bc f1 75 89
d0 96 b1 e3 d2 7a 1b 70 58 03 47 80 9c 06 ba c9 54
e0 ad 41 99 48 7e 3a 95 e0 ec 07 63 7b b2 21 b0 4a
f0 8d d6 15 fb 9d 5d 8c 42 08 b6 eb a7 b5 e5 52 82
FIGURE 7. An optimized S-box Sc(8, 8) using Algorithm 1
ACNV greater than 114. However, we have found out that
the multi-armed bandit problem [31] [32] [33] [34] is closely
related to the nonlinearity optimization problem.
Each bijective S-box S(n, n) can be represented as a
collection of n bandits, such that each bandit uniquely cor-
responds to some of the n coordinates of S. The arms of each
bandit could be associated with the operation of applying a
single transposition in S, while the profit of our action could
be measured with the fitness function presented in Algorithm
1.
Associating each one of the possible
(
n
2
)
transposition of
elements of S DLUT to some distinct arm in each bandit is a
trivial and non-working model - at the end, the bandits would
be indistinguishable. Having this in mind, the following
model is constructed:
• Property I: Since each bandit uniquely corresponds
to some coordinate of S, each bandit arm is restricted
to initiate a transposition of two bits inside a column
of SLUT only (instead of a transposition of any two
elements in SDLUT ).
• Property II: To keep the bijective property of S, in case
VOLUME 4, 2016 5
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an arm of some bandit is activated, the set of all distinct(
2n
2
)
bit transpositions in a given coordinate of SLUT
is restricted to a subset of transpositions with a size of
2n−1.
The restriction introduced in Property II is motivated by
the following observations:
1) Existence: If b1b2 · · · bi · · · bn is a row from SLUT ,
flipping the bit bi will result in some other row
R = b1b2 · · · bi · · · bn in SLUT . Otherwise, if R is not
among the rows of SLUT , S is not surjective, therefore
not bijective, which contradicts our initial choice of S.
2) One-to-one Maping: If b1b2 · · · bi · · · bn is a row from
SLUT , flipping the bit bi will result in only one row
R = b1b2 · · · bi · · · bn in SLUT . Otherwise, if some
other row R
′
of SLUT exists, s.t. R ≡ R′ , S is not
injective, therefore not bijective, which contradicts our
initial choice of S.
3) Search space: The total number of distinct bit se-
quences of the form b1b2 · · · bi−1bi+1 · · · bn is 2n−1.
Let’s denote as a bandit Bi the bandit, which corresponds
to the i-th coordinate of S. Each bandit consists of 2n−1
distinct arms, s.t. each arm of Bi corresponds to a distinct
value of b1b2 · · · bi−1bi+1 · · · bn. Activating an arm ofBi will
result of interchanging two rows of SLUT , which differ only
in bit position i.
For example, let’s consider an S-box X(4,4), with
XDLUT = [15, 14, 9, 2, 11, 3, 12, 4, 1, 13, 7, 8, 6, 10,
5, 0]. X is a bijective S-box with dimension 4. Therefore,
we can transform X as an 8-armed 4-bandit problem. In
Figure 8, a visual interpretation of the bandits transformation
of X is shown. Each row corresponds to a distinct bandit,
while each pair of cells inside a given row, sharing the same
color, corresponds to an arm of the given bandit. The x-axis
represents the indexes of elements of XDLUT (starting from
1).
As an illustration, if we activate the white arm of bandit
1, we interchange the elements of XDLUT with indexes 14
and 4, i.e. 10 and 2. Their respective binary representations
(with zero-fill of 4) are 1010 and 0010 (they differ only in bit
position 1).
The profit (if any) of activating a bandit Bi’s arm is
measured by the same function E presented in Algorithm 1.
The transformation of the (n,n) bijective S-box ACNV
optimization problem to the 2n−1-armed n-bandit problem
allows us to focus on the optimization of the nonlinearity of
single coordinates. Furthermore, by design, activating an arm
of a given bandit doesn’t affect the states of other bandits.
Having this in mind, Algorithm 2 is proposed.
VII. RESULTS PART II
Our implementation of Algorithm 2 is based on a simple
strategy Λ - we always choose a bandit, which posses the
lowest nonlinearity. In case there are several bandits sharing
the lowest value of nonlinearity, we choose one of them at
random.
Algorithm 2
1: s← R(n) . the function R(n) generates pseudo-random
bijective S-box S(n, n)
2: Ω←MODEL(s) . We transform the S-box s to a
2n−1-armed n-bandit problem
3: repeat
4: bandit← random(1, n,Λ) .
We choose a random bandit from [1, n], based on some
profit-maximizing strategy Λ
5: arm← random(1, 2n−1) . We choose a random
arm from
[
1, 2n−1
]
6: oldBandit← E(bandit)
7: ACTIVATE(bandit, arm)
8: if E(bandit) < E(oldBandit) then
9: Ω←MODEL(s) . We update the model
10: else
11: ACTIVATE(bandit, arm) . We resume the
original state of the bandit
12: end if
13: until STOP condition is reached . reaching n2n−1
consequent unsuccessful attempts
TABLE 5. Nonlinearities of the S-box coordinates given in Figure 9
Method f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 f8
this work 116 114 116 114 114 114 114 114
We launched Algorithm 2 as a stand-alone optimization
routine, starting from pseudo-randomly generated S-boxes,
and in almost all of the instances we reached S-boxes with an
average coordinate nonlinearity value of 112. However, when
we initiated Algorithm 2 with S-boxes, which have been al-
ready optimized by Algorithm 1, we have reached an average
coordinate nonlinearity value of 114.5. An example of such
S-box is given in Figure 9. The corresponding nonlinearity
by coordinates is given in Table 5.
In Table 6, an extended S-box comparison between the
state-of-the-art methods is given. The entries are sorted, in
increasing order, by ACNV (the last column).
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
CF-based S-box construction is a relatively new and inter-
esting technique, which interconnects the tools provided by
various academic disciplines with the problem of finding
secure cryptographic primitives.
In this paper, we analyzed the actual linear cryptanaly-
sis resistance of CF-based S-boxes, which differs from the
average nonlinearity value announced by a great number of
papers. Integrating such S-boxes in a cryptosystem should be
done with a considerable caution. For example, if we inter-
change the Rijndael S-box in AES [6] with some CF-based
S-box with higher ACNV, but lower overall nonlinearity, the
resulting modified block cipher will be significantly weaker
in terms of resistance to linear cryptanalysis. Furthermore,
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FIGURE 8. An example of 8-armed 4-bandit problem transformation of the S-box X
TABLE 6. A comparison of S-boxes, yielded by various methods to be found
in the literature, with those S-boxes, reached by the algorithms presented in
this work
Method Min NL Max NL ACNV
[35] [36] 84 106 100.0
[37] 98 108 102.3
[38] 96 106 102.5
[39] 100 106 103.0
[40] 96 106 103.0
[41] 98 108 103.0
[42] 98 108 103.2
[43] 100 106 103.2
[44] 99 106 103.3
[45] 96 108 103.5
[46] 101 108 103.8
[47] 101 106 103.8
[48] 102 106 104.0
[49] 98 108 104.0
[50] 100 106 104.0
[51] 102 106 104.0
[52] 98 108 104.0
[19] 102 108 104.5
[53] [54] 100 108 104.7
[55] [56] 102 108 104.7
[57] 100 108 104.75
[58] 100 107 104.8
[59] 104 106 105.0
[60] 102 108 105.2
[15] 102 108 105.3
[61] 100 110 105.5
[62] 98 110 105.5
[63] 102 110 105.5
[64] 104 108 105.7
[65] 102 108 106.0
[66] [67] [68]a 104 110 106.0
[68]c 106 108 106.0
[69] 104 110 106.2
[70] 104 110 106.5
[16] 106 108 106.5
[71] [72] 106 108 106.7
[73] 104 108 106.7
[74] 106 110 107.0
[68]b 104 108 107.0
[75] 106 108 107.5
[76] 106 110 107.75
[20] 108 108 108.0
[77] 104 110 108.0
[18] 106 110 108.5
[78] 108 112 109.0
[79] [80] [81] 112 112 112.0
Alg.2 (this work) 112 112 112.0
Alg.1 (this work) 114 114 114.0
Alg.1
⋃
Alg.2 (this work) 114 116 114.5
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
00 a9 7b bb c9 0a 55 d1 c1 a3 1a 24 26 bf 72 f6 0d
10 4a 73 e2 f1 3a d3 35 b2 64 93 f5 d7 ff dc cb 4e
20 de 7a a2 98 d9 87 b3 a5 28 ba a0 45 56 67 61 0c
30 a7 33 53 2d e7 58 7e b6 37 71 1e 10 d0 e0 b7 49
40 96 91 6e b0 f9 5b fb 13 8a db ad a1 8c 39 22 ee
50 89 4f 50 da 07 75 65 bd 9f 18 cd 17 41 be 2f 40
60 ca 05 ae 32 94 f7 a8 b1 aa f8 e9 e4 82 54 01 69
70 27 81 5c 84 7f b4 29 d2 fc 0e a4 36 90 2e 15 00
80 4c 51 25 11 16 f3 3d 8d 9c 6c 95 ef 76 cc 8b dd
90 2b f4 ce 43 62 d4 74 fe 92 c2 7c 80 2a 21 68 bc
a0 c0 23 af e3 78 6f e1 eb 03 38 09 42 d6 ed ec 02
b0 1d fa 5e b9 c8 c7 46 14 e6 99 9d 04 c4 d8 3f 9b
c0 e5 4d 31 63 79 3c d5 f0 47 57 4b c6 f2 2c 70 b5
d0 cf 9e 0b 3e 1f 5a a6 6a 6b 12 1b 77 5f 48 ac 3b
e0 44 34 5d ea 20 85 8f 30 9a ab 1c c3 59 8e fd 08
f0 b8 e8 06 6d 66 7d df 60 52 83 88 19 0f 97 c5 86
FIGURE 9. An optimized, by applying the composition of Algorithms 1 and 2,
(8,8) S-box
we show that exploiting chaos structures, in the context of
nonlinearity optimization problem, is arguable. Thus, the
benefits of using chaos structures in the design of S-boxes is
unclear and yet to be determined. However, as stated in [82],
the chaos-based designs may be an alternative to application
attacks, such as side-channel analysis.
Nevertheless, from designer perspective, if the overall
nonlinearity value of an S-box S is negligible compared to
the average nonlinearity value of all coordinates of S, two
novel S-box constructions are suggested.
While Algorithm 1 yields better results than Algorithm
2, the latest could be used as an Algorithm 1 extension, to
further improve the parameters of the resulting S-box. The
methods presented in this paper significantly outperform all
other state-of-the-art methods for designing S-boxes with
high ACNV.
The linkage of the n-armed bandit problem to the prob-
lem of finding such S-boxes, opens an interesting area of
future research - the investigation of how other state-of-the-
art methods, such as the concept of fuzzy graphs [83] [84],
the stochastic optimization techniques [85] [86] [87], or the
exploration-exploitation algorithms [88] [89] [90], could be
exploited to further maximize the ACNV of a given S-box.
An interesting open question to be answered is to what
extend the ACNV value of an (8,8) bijective S-box could be
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optimized? As summarized in [91], the maximal nonlinearity
value achieved in balanced boolean functions with 8 variables
is 116. Therefore, if an ACNV for an (8,8) bijective S-box
greater than 116.0 is ever found, at least one of its eight com-
ponents will posses nonlinearity value 118, which will finally
give an answer to the long-standing problem of the maximum
possible nonlinearity value of an eight variable balanced
boolean functions. Furthermore, as shown in [92], the upper
bound for eight variable balanced boolean functions is less
than 120. Thus, the maximum theoretical possible ACNV of
(8,8) bijective S-boxes is less or equal to 118.0, but most
probably, considering the academic skepticism that eight
variable balanced boolean functions with nonlinearity value
118 really exist, less or equal to 116.0.
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